Nearly a decade after the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the institution is at a crossroads. The ICC is enjoying increasing influence on the world stage, even among some states originally opposed to its activities. At the same time, support for the Court among African states, which constitute the greatest number of state parties to the ICC’s governing statute and the only states in which the Court has active situations and cases, appears to be fading. This year, to challenge perceived geographic bias, the African Union encouraged its member states to endorse an African for the office of chief prosecutor in the Court’s upcoming elections, a move that raised concerns about possible politicization of the office. These concerns aside, the election of a qualified African prosecutor could enhance the profile of the Court in Africa. Moreover, such an election may well strengthen the Court by making the ICC more representative, by amplifying voices of African communities supportive of the ICC, and by further illuminating the need for the empowerment and reform of national justice systems whose inability or unwillingness to try crimes under international law domestically has given the Court motive to prosecute in the first place.

   Over the last ten years, American and international observers have fiercely criticized U.S. detention policies for the perceived abuse of detainees and the allegedly unfair criminal process applied to them. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have sought to quiet criticisms concerning U.S. detainee policy, with the most recent pronouncement, putting forth a more “values-oriented” approach, coming in a March 7, 2011, White House press statement. This Essay focuses on the Administration’s proclamations regarding the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions, analyzing what, if any, practical effect they will have on detainee treatment. Section I briefly reviews key post-9/11 U.S. decisions on the treatment of detainees and their Geneva-based status as detainees. Sections II and III analyze whether the March policy will change the day-to-day treatment of detainees, as well as the policy’s impact on detainee trials. This Essay concludes that the Obama Administration’s March announcement has virtually no practical impact on the day-to-day operations of the U.S. military and its treatment of detainees. Perhaps the more important impact of the announcement is in its symbolism. Obama’s statements make clear that the United States is moving away from abuse and toward fair trials, a renewed adherence to international law, and the acceptance and ratification of the APs. Optimistically, this in turn will enhance U.S. esteem within the international community and lead to positive international cooperation and development in the international law of armed conflict. 

Following the passage of the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 (the “Bribery Act”), businesses both in the United Kingdom and abroad expressed great concern over the expansive extraterritorial implications the new law could have on their own conduct. Indeed, the Bribery Act’s prohibitions appear to extend far beyond those of its U.S. counterpart, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”). Among the most controversial of the Bribery Act’s provisions is the treatment of “corporate hospitality payments. The Bribery Act is so broad that it effectively treats all corporate hospitality payments to foreign public officials as prima facie violations. As a result, scholars analyzing the Bribery Act have explained its provisions “could potentially sweep in legitimate conduct.” 

On March 30, 2011, following months of criticism, the U.K. Ministry of Justice released its long awaited Guidance on the Bribery Act in order to assist businesses to better understand and comply with the law upon going into effect on July 1, 2011. Interestingly, while the MoJ Guidance sheds new light on the most troublesome provisions of the Bribery Act, it also indicates some backpedaling on the part of U.K. officials. The result has been to make this feature of the Bribery Act appear all the more like the FCPA. 

Raymond Davis, a United States national, killed two Pakistanis in Lahore on January 27, 2011 — allegedly in self-defense. The Raymond Davis case had the potential to become a major foreign policy issue between Pakistan and the United States. The resolution of the issue was compounded by subsequent media reports that Raymond Davis was a CIA agent who was on assignment at the time of the double murder.  While keeping tight-lipped about its position on the question of immunity, Pakistan sought to explore alternative dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve this diplomatically sensitive and politically explosive matter. The Pakistani trial court resolved the case by applying Islamic law principles that allowed Raymond Davis to be released after the heirs of the victims were compensated. Even though the matter has been resolved privately through this compensation scheme, the handling of the Raymond Davis case has generated a lot of controversy and the outcome is not generally accepted by the Pakistani public, which still seeks answers to the host of issues — both factual and legal — about Raymond Davis’s official status and immunity, if any, arising therefrom. 

On February 17, 2011, protestors asleep in Pearl square were attacked by government forces, and at least five people were killed. The King of Bahrain apologized for the use of force, and troops were withdrawn. A political deadlock followed, during which leading parties from Bahrain on both sides rallied in favor of the usefulness of a constitutional dialogue for which this Essay was written.

This Essay proposes a number of available compromises that refrain from doing away with a monarchy altogether and focuses on the minimal constitutional arrangements needed for a monarchy to be effectively “constitutional,” with “constitutional” understood as democratic in the pattern of countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, and recently Bhutan.