Constitutions ♦ Online 66 Va. J. Int’l L. Online 2 (2026)

Fuzzy Presidential Powers to Curb Ministerial Abuse of Emergency Powers in India

Rohit Raguram

The Constitution of India vests executive power in the President, but in practice, courts and the public treat the office as largely ceremonial and bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers. The divergence between text and convention has produced indeterminate or “fuzzy” presidential powers, and efforts to clarify the President’s role through judicial decisions and constitutional amendments have only added to the uncertainty.

Drawing on constitutional text, judicial precedents, and historical instances of emergency power abuse, this Essay argues that the fuzziness surrounding presidential authority should be interpreted neither to reduce the President to a symbolic “rubber- stamp” nor to justify an assertive executive capable of exercising discretionary powers independent of ministerial advice. Instead, ambiguity in the President’s constitutional powers should be resolved asymmetrically: in favor of the President when she acts to restrain ministerial abuse of emergency powers, and against her when she attempts to exercise expansive authority herself. Such a framework would enable the President to function as a limited constitutional check on the Council of Ministers—particularly in the context of emergency provisions—without undermining India’s parliamentary system.